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NOTES
PRIORITIES OF "FUTURE ADVANCES" UNDER
PREVIOUSLY PERFECTED SECURITY INTERESTS
AND ARTICLE 9 OF THE U.C.C.
Future advances financing is a useful credit device for both
lender and debtor; and as such, is an important feature of Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter "UCC" or
"Code").' Briefly, future advances lending calls for a lender to
advance future installments of a loan, established either by a prede-
termined schedule or at the discretion of the lender, and based on
a security interest perfected at the time of the original installment.
Typically, future advances financing is used where a lender
requires security for its loan and valuable property is legally avail-
able for use as collateral, and the collateral is sufficient to secure
all or most of the advances. The lender, however, is unwilling to
lend or the borrower is not in need of the entire contemplated
amount at the onset, so they prefer to establish a line of credit. 2
This allows closer supervision of the loan and more rigid policing
of the collateral by the creditor, but the debtor pays no interest on
the unused portions of the installments and postpones the incur-
ment of interest until the advances are actually made.
Future advances financing has been used with varied success in
commercial transactions for many years. The drafters of the UCC,
however, wished to reverse the "vaguely articulated prejudices
against future advance agreements" which developed at common
law and under chattel mortgage statutes.' The desire of the draf-
ters notwithstanding, confusion exists as to the relative priorities
established under the filing provisions of the Code between credi-
tors where the financing statement fails to indicate that the original
security agreement is intended to cover future advances, and future
advances are contemplated or have been made. The result is reluct-
ance by lenders to extend credit. Loans may not be made when
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (hereinafter "UCC"). The American Law Institute,
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 1972 Official Text. The
U.C.C. was adopted in Wisconsin by the Laws of 1963, ch. 158 and is now found at Wis.
STAT. ch. 401-409. Article 9 of the U.C.C. is found at Wis. STAT. ch. 409 and most revisions
found in the 1972 Official Text were adopted by the Laws of 1973, ch. 215.
2. See, Comment, Priority of Future Advances Lending Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 128 (1967).
3. U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 5.
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adequate collateral is available, or the original creditor is given
great leeway in establishing terms of a second loan.
Typically, this situation arises where the initial creditor lends
funds on a particular asset or class of assets for what he believes
to be a single loan. Funds are advanced and a proper financing
statement is filed in compliance with local filing requirements, but
no provisions are made for future advances. Before the debt is
repaid in full, however, additional funds are advanced or the loan
is refinanced with the intention that the original collateral form the
security for the new advances. No new financing statement is filed,
however. Between the time of the original loan and the refinancing,
a second creditor has lent money to the same debtor, creating a
perfected security in the same collateral.' If the debtor becomes
insolvent, and the collateral proves insufficient to repay the loans,
both parties will claim priority. Neither the UCC comments or
judicial decisions aid in determination of the proper outcome. Wis-
consin is among the majority of jurisdictions in not having decided
this issue.'
A lender in a jurisdiction without controlling authority con-
fronts a similar problem. No lender realistically expects the law to
apprise him of the business risks he faces in loaning funds in a
particular situation, but no business risk can intelligently be evalu-
ated unless a lender is fully apprised of the legal risks, and this the
UCC fails to do. The attorneys for each creditor can find support-
ing cases, and can only advise their respective clients that the law
is unsettled on this point. The original lender fears the original
financing statement will not secure later payments. The second
creditor, on the other hand, fears later advances by the original
creditor will preclude assertion of rights in the collateral. The per-
son seeking the loan, therefore, might have sufficient collateral to
4. WIs. STAT. §§ 409. 303-.305. (1971)
5. The following cases have dealt with future advances in Wisconsin: John Miller Supply
Co. v. Western State Bank, 55 Wis. 2d 385, 199 N.W.2d 161 (1971); In re Glawe, 6 U.C.C.
Rptr. 876 (E.D. Wis. 1969); In re Zwicker, 8 U.C.C. Rptr. 924 (W.D. Wis. 1971); Barth
Brothers v. Billings, 68 Wis. 2d 80, 227 N.W.2d 673 (1975).
6. WIs. STAT. § 409.204 was amended by Laws of 1973, ch. 215 to conform to U.C.C.
1972 Official Text. Prior to that it read:
When Security Interest Attaches; After-Acquired Propterty; Future Advances
(1) A security interest cannot attach until there is agreement (subsection (3) of
Section 1-201) that it attach and value is given and the debtor has rights in the
collateral. It attaches as soon as all of the events in the preceding sentence have taken
place unless explicit agreement postpones the time of attaching.
(2) For the purposes of this section the debtor has no-rights
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justify a loan, but not be able to secure one from either lender.
While this might be a difficult situation for the second creditor, it
is an intolerable situation for the person seeking the loan. The
Code itself, however, offers no answer.
The Code unquestionably endorses future advances financing.
Section 9-204(3) states:
(3) Obligations covered by a security agreement may in-
clude future advances or other value whether or not the advances
or value are given pursuant to commitments.
The official comment to this section indicates that collateral "may
secure future as well as present advances when the security agree-
ment so provides." 7 For a valid loan of this type, the parties need
only execute a security agreement that provides for future
(a) in crops until they are planted or otherwise become growing crops, in
the young of livestock until they are conceived;
(b) in fish until caught, in oil, gas or minerals until they are extracted, in
timber until it is cut;
(c) in a contract right until the contract has been made;
(d) in an account until it comes into existence.
(3) Except as provided in subsection (i) a security agreement may provide
that collateral, whenever acquired, shall secure all obligations covered by the security
agreement.
(4) No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause
(a) to crops which become such more than one year after the security agree-
ment is executed except that a security interest in crops which is given in
conjunction with a lease or a land purchase or improvement transaction
evidenced by a contract, mortgage or deed of trust may if so agreed attach
to crops to be grown on the land concerned during the period of such real
estate transaction;
(b) to consumer goods other than accessions (Section 9-314) when given as
additional security unless the debtor acquires rights in them within ten days
after the secured party gives value.
(5) Obligations covered by a security agreement may include future advances
or other value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commit-
ment.
It now reads:
409.204 After-acquired property; future advances. (1) Except as provided in sub. (2),
a security agreement may provide that any or all obligations covered by the security
agreement are to be secured by after-acquired collateral.
(2) No security interest attaches under an after-acquired property clause to
consumer goods other than accessions under s. 409.314 when given as additional
security unless the debtor acquires rights in them within 10 days after the secured
party gives value.
(3) Obligations covered by a security agreement may include furture advances
or other value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commit-
ment (s. 409.105(1)).
History: 1973c.215.
7. U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 5.
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advances. The creditor must also file a financing statement with
the Secretary of State and the county Register of Deeds, but, in
accord with the "notice filing" objective of the Code, no specific
information, other than reservation of the right to future advance
secured by the named collateral, is required.8 Thus, it is fairly
simple for the lender to enter a secured transaction providing for
future advances. Nevertheless, some lenders have attempted to
secure their future without making an exact compliance with the
simple requirements of the Code. Later, the creditor may learn the
price of his error.
The principal cases in this area holding a financing statement
which fails to indicate the loan is secured by future advances, and
is filed by the original creditor, will not give it priority over a
secured creditor lending funds and taking a security in the identical
collateral are: Coin-O-Matic Service Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital
Trust Co.,9 Safe Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Berman." In Re
Merriman" and In Re Rive1 2 are the leading cases holding to the
contrary.
In Coin-O-Matic" the debtor secured an automobile with a
loan for its purchase which was assigned to defendant trust com-
pany. The debtor then borrowed money from plaintiff, Coin-O-
Matic, who took a security in the same vehicle. The trust company
subsequently refinanced the original loan, cancelled the original
security agreement, and took a new note from the debtor. The
original financing statement was not terminated, and the debtor
owed money to the defendant trust company at all times. The
debtor then went bankrupt. Priority was granted to the second
creditor, Coin-O-Matic. The court rejected defendant trust com-
pany's argument that the express provision for future advances in
section 9-204(5)" is merely permissive. The court reasoned that
such a rule would stymie commercial transactions and create a
great deal of uncertainty for other creditors as to the existence of
future advances. The court found only one security agreement con-
templated by only one loan, and without express provisions in the
8. For an excellent discussion of filing problems under the U.C.C. see Haydock, The
Improved Filing Rules Proposed by the Review Committee for Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 26 Bus. LAW. 1163 (1971).
9. 3 U.C.C. Rptr. 1112 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1966).
10. 393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968).
I1. 4 U.C.C. Rptr. 234 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
12. 299 F.Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
13. 3 U.C.C. Rptr. 1112 (R.I. Sup. Ct. 1966).
14. Laws of 1963, ch. 158, § 409.204(5) (now Wis. Stat, § 409.204(3)).
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agreement, a filed financing statement could not act as an umbrella
for future advances to the detriment of other creditors. The origi-
nal creditor, therefore, lost his priority.
Safe Deposit Bank and Trust Co. v. Berman,15 similarly holds
that the original creditor fails in his claim for priority. On June 26
the plaintiff bank and the debtor entered into a loan agreement.
On July 30, a substantial sum was lent on a note providing for a
"security interest in accounts receivable, contract rights, etc.,
under agreement dated 6-26-63; also in equipment, etc., under se-
curity agreements dated 5-6-63 and 7-30-63."16 The July agreement
was intended "to secure payment of the Total Debt. . .and also
any and all liabilities of the debtor to secured party under this
agreement or said note or notes or any renewals or extensions
thereof."17 The security interest was perfected and later advances
were made upon notes with the same language found in the July
note. The initial note, meanwhile, had been paid off in September.
When the debtor went bankrupt, the bank attempted to argue
that either the perfected July security agreement covered future
advances or that each note for each advance constituted a security
agreement in itself. The court did not agree. It held that the origi-
nal agreement had provided for renewals or extensions of the July
note but not for future advances. The court found no merit to the
bank's agrument that language on the notes would properly cover
the deficiency in the security agreement. It felt that to hold other-
wise would create unneeded confusion in commercial financing and
supported its ruling by finding, as the court in Coin-O-Matic did,
that the agreement contemplated only one loan and to hold any
other way w, ould unfairly harm subsequent creditors who relied
upon the repayment of the original loan. In this case the interven-
ing creditor was not a second secured creditor, but a trustee in
bankruptcy, although that fact should make no legal difference. A
trustee in bankruptcy takes the power of a secured creditor as of
the date of the filing of the petition in bankruptcy." Presumably,
an intervening judgment creditor could also take advantage of the
Coin-O-Matic rule.
Coin-O-Matic, Safe Deposit Bank and supporting cases" pay
15. 393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968).
16. Id. at 402.
17. Id.
18. Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § l10(c) (1966).
19. In re Sanelco, 7 U.C.C. Rptr. 65 (M.D. Fla. 1969); In re Hagler, 10 U.C.C. Rptr.
1285 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); Household Finance Corp. v. Bank Commissioner of Maryland,
284 Md. 233, 235 A.2d 732 (1967).
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particular attention to the mechanics of the various Code provi-
sions. The Code requirement for a properly perfected security
agreement is not particularly burdensome, 20 and provides, as was
pointed out by a Florida court, for flexibility in shaping credit
arrangements to fit a particular situation.2' A security agreement
may provide for a line of credit or for a single loan. It may also
call for a security in specific collateral, a class of collateral, or for
a security on each of a debtor's assets. Provision is also made for
a second or third credit agreement securing the same assets, but
for each credit arrangement the provisions of the Code that relate
to that particular agreement must be complied with to advise a
subsequent creditor of the debtor's status.22 When those require-
ments are not met, the Coin-O-Matic rule voids the security. The
requirements are not complicated, and the burden is not onerous.
The penalty for failure to comply, therefore, is not harsh.
In re Rivet,23 In re Merriman,24 and the cases that follow
them hold otherwise. These cases take a much more philosophical
view of the application of Article 9 in this situation, and view the
entire pattern of subsequent loans perfected by the original financ-
ing statement as a continual debtor-creditor relationship. This di-
verges from the more mechanical application of specific Code pro-
visions.
The leading case in support of this proposition, and the case
apparently most in accord with the revision committee of the
UCC, is In re Rivet.28 In that case the court overruled a lower
court. A lender filed a single financing statement and subsequently
made four additional loans, making each prior note and mortgage
as "refinanced and included in the new note." z The lower court2
held that section 9-204 was not complied with because the original
security agreement filed did not provide for future advances, nor
was a new financing statement with each succeeding loan. The
referee in bankruptcy disregarded the creditor's "notice filing"
20. WIS. STAT. §§ 409.303-.305.
21. In re Sanelco, 7 U.C.C. Rptr. 65 (M.D. Fla. 1968).
22. Id.
23. 299 F.Supp. 374 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
24. 4 U.C.C. Rptr. 234 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
25. Cantrill Construction Co. v. Carter, 418 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1969); Mid-Eastern
Electronics, Inc. v. First National Bank of Southern Maryland, 455 F.2d 141 (5th Cir.
1970).
26. 299 F.Supp. 374 (1969).
27. Id. at 375.
28. Reported at 4 U.C.C. Rptr. 1087 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
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argument and ruled that in light of the available alternatives for
securing the later loans, which were not complied with, the later
loans were unsecured. The district court reversed holding that,
while the later loans were technically not future advances in the
absence of an express security agreement provision, the "first to
file" rule29 was invoked by the filing of the initial financing state-
ment. The court found an agreement, value, and attachment for
each subsequent loan. Therefore, despite the haphazard order of
perfecting, a valid security interest had been created. Since the
Code merely provides for a notice filing system, it is encumbent
upon prospective creditors to look beyond the financing statement
for information. A single security interest was created and the
lender had priority as to all four subsequent loans.
In re Merriman" involved a very similar fact situation and the
same result as In re Rivet was obtained. There the court placed
particular emphasis on a continuous creditor-debtor relationship.
As such, the court pointed out, no prospective lien holder could
have been misled by the arrangement. The collateral had not been
changed nor had the parties sought any change in their relation-
ship. In essence, this court also relied on the notice filing aspect of
perfection under the UCC.
The fundamental concept on which In re Rivet was grounded
is the Code's system of notice filing. The burden of investigation
is placed on the subsequent creditor. A financing statement is
deemed sufficient to cover any later loans even where the original
security agreement did not contemplate any later loans. The rule
of Rivet has been characterized as the "better rule." 31 Indeed, in
the Preliminary Draft Number 2 of the UCC, the Review Commit-
tee for Article 9 addressed itself to the problem of priorities when
subsequent loans are secured by an earlier financing statement and
concluded that Rivet more accurately reflected the intent of Article
9 than Coin-O-Matic and Merriman."2 The Committee empha-
sized the notice filing aspects of the Code and the fact that section
9-402(1) expressly allows for the filing of a financing statement
where there is no security agreement and that section 9-204, which
outlines future advances requirements, is limited to security agree-
29. Wis. Stat. § 409.303.
30. 4 U.C.C. Rptr. 234 (S.D. Ohio 1962).
3 1. James Talcott, Inc. v. Franklin National Bank of Minneapolis, 292 Minn. 277, 194
N.W.2d 775 (1972).
32. 4 U.C.C. Rptr. 234.
1975]
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ments and does not include financing statements. 3
Unfortunately, as unquestionable as the Review Committee's
logic might be, in reality it introduces an entirely new dimension
to secured credit financing that, apparently, was not even consid-
ered by the Committee. A subsequent creditor will be most reluc-
tant to lend funds on an agreement that takes security in a pre-
viously encumbered asset. As long as the original creditor has even
one dollar remaining in the asset, it is possible for him to loan up
to the full loan value of the collateral and preempt any creditor
who takes a junior security in the same collateral. This also makes
it more difficult to ferret out the various loans and potential loans,
of course, which can only increase the initial amount of money tied
up in loan service. This will be of a relatively insignificant amount
for large commercial borrowers, but of a more meaningful amount
for the small business. More importantly, the Rivet rationale inev-
itably ties the debtor to the original creditor should he wish to
borrow more money on the same collateral, even if the funds are
available at better rates elsewhere.
A prudent investor will be most reluctant to lend money where
a valid financing statement covers the collateral that will form the
basis of the security in the second loan for fear of losing its security
in the collateral by a future loan by the original creditor. For
example, A enters into a perfected security agreement with B
whereby B will lend $25,000 to A and take a security in X, B's
principal asset. Later A seeks to borrow $10,000 from C for capital
expansion and has repaid $20,000 of his original loan to B. B also
wishes to make the second loan to A but at substantially higher
interest rates. B, therefore, refuses to partially terminate his secu-
rity interest in X. Under the "better" Rivet rationale, C could not
lend A the $10,000 and perfect a security interest in X, and B later
lend A another $20,000 ($5,000 still remains to be paid on the
original loan). A would have a security interest in the first $25,000
of X or the full amount. C would then be an unsecured creditor.
This development clearly upsets the normal debtor-creditor rela-
tionship and places the final decision as to which creditor will make
the second loan not in the hands of the debtor, but, for all practical
purposes, in the hands of the original creditor. The resulting role
reversal was not bargained for or perhaps even contemplated. The
result, however, is clear.
33. U.C.C. Preliminary Draft #2, p. 1094.
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Moreover, this can also be used as a device for maintaining
artificially high interest rates. In a market of declining interest
rates, the original high interest rate lender effectively precludes a
partial refinancing of the original loan by a second creditor seeking
a security interest in the original collateral. Unless the second
creditor has sufficient funds to cover the entire value remaining on
the original he faces the same prospect of being frozen out of his
security interest as the second creditor did in the example above.
Again, the original creditor is given substantial control over the
debtor's later decision - control, it might be pointed out, that was
never bargained for. This situation clearly works to the benefit of
the large commercial lenders, lenders experienced in the field of
secured loans. This is not a situation where different notes are
reissued covering the same collateral and the same agreement with-
out any further advances of funds.34 In this situation the debtor
who cannot fully repay his original loan, thereby forcing a termina-
tion of the original financing statement, might wish a second loan
or a partial repayment at lower interest rates than offered by the
original lender, but no prudent creditor could take a security in the
collateral without fear of losing its security interest.
The further advantage of the rule in Coin-O-Matic not found
in In re Rivet is that it is self-regulating, but maximizes the loan
potential of an asset. Under Coin-0-Matic a debtor can never
borrow more than 100% of the value of its collateral but should
have no legal problem finding a lender willing to take a security
in the unsecured portions of the asset should the original creditor
be unwilling to make the subsequent loan. If A, in the above exam-
ple, should borrow $25,000 from B, securing the loan with asset X
which is worth $25,000, and A repays $10,000 of the original loan,
he is only in a position to borrow an additional $10,000 from B or
C. Under the rule in Rivet, A could borrow $10,000 from C secur-
ing the loan with a junior lien on X. A could still borrow $10,000
from B and give security to B for 100% of the loan. Under Coin-
0-Matic, B would be an unsecured creditor, for all practical pur-
poses, as to the amount of the second loan.
As the situation stands today, a jurisdiction is free to choose
between the Coin-0-Matic line of cases or the "better rule" of In
re Rivet. It is submitted that the Article 9 Review Committee's
endorsement of In re Rivet was not based on the practical effect
34. Which distinguishes it from 292 Minn. 277, 194 N.W.2d 775 (1972) at note 31,
supra.
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the Rivet rule would have vis-A-vis the debtor-original creditor
relationship when the second loan (or refinancing) is bargained for.
With a little thought of the unwarranted and unbargained for con-
trol this places at the disposal of the original creditor, who may
never even have intended any subsequent loans, the "better rule"
may be the rule in Coin-O-Matic rather than In re Rivet. The
burden placed on the original creditor is not onerous and the cost
is nominal. The bargaining position of the debtor in relation to the
original creditor is restored to what it should be, a choice among
competitors. In short, even without official sanction, the rule in
Coin-O-Matic may prove to be a better policy decision. One thing
is quite clear, however, and that is whichever position is adopted,
either legislatively or judicially, it is a situation that calls for reso-
lution.
C. JUDLEY WYANT
WILLIAM G. THIEL
